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Abstract
Reputation indexes of employment protection have proven popular constructs in studies of the
covariation of labor market institutions and macroeconomic outcomes. Portugal occupies an
unenviable rank order in such measures of the stringency of employment protection. We
critique this reputation in two ways: first, by offering a modicum of  'corrective' institutional
detail on the nature of employment protection in Portugal; and, second, and more
substantively, by offering a detailed analysis of the process of labor adjustment in Portugal,
benchmarked to other-country experience. The latter exercise – based on a two- and one-stage
error correction model – reveals Portugal to have a very high speed of adjustment to
deviations from the long-run employment-output equilibrium – a result that is clearly at odds
with its allegedly sclerotic labor market. More in accord with received wisdom is the very
smooth labor adjustment mechanism characterizing the United Kingdom. The most notable
feature of the German results is the deterioration in that country's speed of adjustment in
recent years. The Spanish case is distinguished by its erratic path of long-run adjustment.
We thank, without implicating, Martin Falk and Viktor Steiner for helpful comments.
11. Introduction
There is a seeming contradiction between its alleged reputation as one of the most
rigid labor markets in OECD-Europe and the apparent ability of the Portuguese economy to
accommodate to changes in output demand during the last two decades. In addition, and
despite a continuous increase in labor force participation, especially among women, the
country has evinced remarkably low unemployment (averaging 5.8 percent over the last
decade). [1]
Portugal is reported to be a near exemplar of arteriosclerosis in two key references in
the literature. First, in assessing the strictness of dismissals protection legislation along the
dimensions of procedural delays, notice and severance pay, and definition of unfair dismissal,
Grubb and Wells (1993, Table 1.3) rank Portugal in first position, tied with Spain, in their  11-
country sample. (The other countries considered here, Germany and the United Kingdom,
ranked fifth and eleventh, respectively.) Widening the definition to include, in addition to
dismissals protection, limitations on fixed-term contracts and restrictions on overtime,
and flexible weekend and night work confirms Portugal's number one position, while
modestly improving Spain's ranking to third – and leaving unchanged the rankings of
Germany and the U.K. (Grubb and Wells, 1993, Table 9.1). Second, the OECD Jobs Study
(1995, Table 6.7, panel B) provides scant relief: Portugal is now ranked second behind Italy in
terms of the rigidity of its employment protection legislation (Germany deteriorates somewhat
on this scoring , Spain improves modestly, and the position of the U.K. as the most flexible
nation is again confirmed.)
These rankings, while not uncontested [2], have exhibited considerable "path
dependence" in the literature, having been used in a variety of studies to measure the
contribution of employment protection to such macoeconomic outcomes as unemployment,
employment, and nonemployment (e.g. Scarpetta, 1996; Nickell, 1997). But it is our
contention that such measures are arbitrary in general and often factually incorrect in the
2specifics – based on a misreading of the law in the Portuguese case. Although we will
illustrate the imprecision that arises in the construction of such regulatory indexes by
reference to Portugal, our main concern is to examine labor market flexibility by looking to
outcomes: net employment and output flows. Based on aggregate data, we derive an
indication of labor market flexibility by investigating the adjustment process of labor demand
following a permanent increase in output.
 There are several advantages of this alternative approach. First, and most obviously, it
avoids arbitrary interpretations of often subtle legal statements and assessment of actual
enforcement procedures. Second, our focus on the employment outcome rather than
unemployment side-steps difficulties of cross-country differences in measurement that
continue to dog even so-called "standardized" measures, as well as the theoretical ambiguity
of the unemployment rate as an indicator of labor market performance (Blanchard and
Portugal, 1998).
It is of course widely accepted that employment protection legislation impacts the
ability of the firm to respond to fluctuations in product demand, because of the constraints
imposed on hiring and firing labor (the arguments are well rehearsed in Hamermesh, 1988,
1993). In these circumstances, it would be no small surprise if a country with a reputation of
rigidity were consistently to display flexibility in reacting to changes in demand conditions.
The extant cross-country evidence on speed of adjustment seems to be broadly supportive of
the theoretical priors. Let us illustrate by taking one of the most prominent stylized facts: the
high speed of adjustment of labor demand in the United States. Studies by Hamermesh
(1988), and by Abraham and Houseman (1993, 1994) confirm that employment adjustment in
the United States is substantially higher than in Europe (and Japan). That being said,
differences between the United States and other countries in the adjustment of hours appears
altogether less pronounced, possibly because of (subsidized) short-time working (Van
Audenrode, 1994), and there is little indication of an increased responsiveness of employment
3adjustment following interludes of labor market liberalization (e.g. Kraft, 1993). However, the
suggestion of a reduced speed of employment adjustment in the United States attendant upon
the erosion of the hire-at-will common law doctrine in that country is more supportive
(Hamermesh, 1993). Clearly, the devil is in the detail.
Although the cross-country evidence is broadly consistent with the theoretical
prediction that higher adjustment costs will reduce the speed of adjustment of employment
behind output, the extant literature relies on ad hoc estimation techniques: the estimated
parameters are obtained from OLS regressions on levels of clearly nonstationary variables, or
by simply running the labor demand model in first differences. In the light of recent
developments in time-series analysis, especially those pertaining to unit roots and
cointegration, the result is that these familiar results lack proper parameterization and that
some reassessment is needed. By looking in some detail at Portuguese manufacturing data and
effecting a comparison with Gemany, Spain, and the U.K., we seek to advance the labor
adjustment discussion by providing better estimates and offering some insight into the vexed
question of the covariation of institutions and labor market outcomes.
The plan of the paper is as follows. First we provide a modicum of detail on
employment protection rules obtaining in Portugal so as to illustrate the caution required in
fixing the notion of rigidity. Second, we briefly address the manufacturing data, 1977:1-
1997:4, and outline the empirical model. Third, our findings are presented along the
dimensions of the time-series properties of the variables, the static cointegrating regression
model, and labor market dynamics. The threads of the preceding arguments are drawn
together in a concluding section.
2. Institutional Detail (Portuguese Labor Legislation)
Roughly half-way through our sample period, a number of changes were introduced
into Portuguese labor law under the 1989 Law on Dismissals (Lei dos Despedimentos). A
4hallmark of this controversial legislation was the freedom given employers to dismiss
individual workers for demand-related reasons. Prior to 1989, and after 1975, individual
dismissals were permitted only on disciplinary grounds.[3] Yet this change in the law was less
substantive than might appear at first blush. This is because collective dismissals have never
been precluded in Portugal, and the threshold size defining a collective dismissal (currently, 2
to 5 employees according to establishment size) is low by international standards.
The pre-1989 prohibition on individual dismissals - for other than disciplinary reasons
– has also to be considered alongside legislation on fixed-term contracts. Such regulations
were explicitly designed to add a degree of freedom to firm labor input decisions, and they
were introduced in 1976 on the heels of legislation that prohibited individual dismissals. The
new law on fixed-term contracts (Decree-Law 781/76, Lei dos Contratos a Prazo) allowed
firms to hire "temporary"  workers almost without restriction. In particular, there was no
obligation on the employer to provide any specific justification for entering into such a
contractual relationship, and neither severance pay nor notice was required at expiry. In
practice, a worker could stay with the firm up to 3 years; and even at the end of this interval it
was not difficult to circumvent the spirit of the law through renewals for a further 3 years. The
1989 Lei dos Despedimentos did make some changes to the status quo ante in that firms were
now required to meet certain conditions before entering into such arrangements. Specifically,
it established eight statutory reasons for concluding of a fixed-term contract. Fixed-term
working arrangements which failed to negotiate these statutory gateways would automatically
be converted into open-ended contracts. Yet, as a practical matter, the new rules do not seem
to have been strictly enforced. And no change in firm behavior in their recourse to fixed-term
contracts can be discerned in a before-and-after comparison of fixed-term contract usage
(Teixeira, 1998).
5How does this characterization of Portuguese law fit the stylized representation of
Portugal as filtered through the standard ranking exercises with which we began our
discussion? First of all, the focus on individual dismissals in the construction of that index
while understandable in allowing analysts to construct a consistent measure across nations,
may be of very limited relevance to labor adjustment; collective rather than individual
dismissals may dominate. Second of all, the Grubb-Wells index lacks any appreciation of the
application of the law. While ruling on economic matters, the courts have in practice not
sought to challenge management prerogative; that is, the economic reasons supplied by the
firm will have a fair chance of being accepted by the Portuguese courts in event of litigation.
In consequence, firms may not see labor laws pertaining to dismissals protection as a real
threat to their competitiveness. This is what we believe underpins the very different results
contained in the EC Survey of Employers, noted earlier. Presumably, we may need to look a
little more carefully at what firms say they do, even if our main interest lies in devining what
they actually do.
The problem is only compounded when one combines indexes containing regulations
covering dismissals, hours of work, fixed term contracts, temporary work agencies, and the
like. Though this is a laudable attempt to capture the entire regulatory climate, it seems
doomed to failure.
If we can agree that any appraisal of the law has to be set in a wider context than any
individual piece of legislation, while admitting that this is particularly difficult to do in the
sense of the overall regulatory climate (other than perhaps in making broad comparisons
between say the United States and Europe) what is the appropriate context? One candidate is
of course the collective bargaining system, not least because the impact of employment
protection mandates can be mitigated by concessions made under collective bargaining – the
tradeoff point. Some remarks on the Portuguese collective bargaining system are particularly
germane in this regard.
6First of all, Portuguese real wage development would appear to have been modest for
more than two decades. Trade unions have generally been unable to secure significant real
wage gains, partly as a result of tripartite regulation/co-ordination involving the government,
one of the two competing trade union confederations, and employer side. In this framework,
the "social partners" set the annual wage target for wage increases, leaving little room for
manoever for negotiations between firms and workers at lower (sectoral and firm) levels. In
consequence, as we have indicated, real wage development has been very modest and stable
across manufacturing sectors (Teixeira, 1999). [4] Another important factor in this
development has been the leading role of the growing public administration sector
(accounting for more than 15 percent of total employment) which has tended to set the
pattern.
A final collective bargaining issue is the competition between rival worker
organizations. This schism has been exploited by successive governments to secure moderate
wage development. Of advantage to the government in this regard has been the rules
governing worker representation in collective bargaining. Indeed, as rival unions have seldom
agreed on whom should be the elected members to bargain with employers, the government
has been accused in many instances of promoting negotiations with weaker unions, and then
using the extension mechanism (Portarias de Extensão) to apply to all workers an agreement
that was ultimately reached with representatives of a tiny minority of workers. This system of
"parallel unionism" implies that employers can select (at sectoral and firm level) which union
they wish to negotiate with. If, at sectoral or firm level, a given union refuses to accept the
extension of a collective agreement that was negotiated with a rival union, the result is that no
collective agreement will apply to the workers in question. This may be the worst of all
scenarios for workers, who will then be covered by the less favorable general law covering
wages and working conditions. The union position is that the government has also threatened
to legislate in areas that unions fail to agree on. On net, these elements combine to produce
7weaker collective bargaining than in other European nations and especially in neighboring
Spain.
3. Data and Methodology
We focus on manufacturing mainly for reasons of data availability. An alternative
would be to include the service sector, but the usual statistical sources do not distinguish the
business service sector from public services. Given that employment in the latter is often
subject to different job security rules, adding in services would be hazardous. Needless to say,
the economic literature covering the manufacturing sector is also much more abundant, which
means that we can more easily check our results.
Our sample period is 1977:1 to 1997:4. Data for the U.K. and Spain were obtained
from the OECD Main Economic Indicators database (quarterly series). Data for Portugal were
collected from the Portuguese Statistical Office (INE) and from the Department of Statistics
of the Portuguese Ministry of Labor. For Germany (West Germany), the main data source was
the OECD database (for the period 1977-1994), supplemented with information from the
Federal Statistical Office (1994 to 1997). Complete information on data sources and definition
of the variables is provided in the Appendix. [5]
As noted earlier, our intention is to assess labor market flexibility by observing how
firms adjust their labor demand to changes in output and factor prices. The presumption is
that, in an event of an exogenous demand shock, and everything else remaining constant,
higher flexibility should be manifested in a higher speed of adjustment of labor demand to the
desired (long-run) equilibrium.
Although we could restrict our focus to a single country – Portugal in the present case
– we found it very useful to conduct the exercise by looking at other countries that might
serve as a benchmark. The additional countries are the U.K., Germany, and Spain. The U.K. is
widely depicted as the most flexible labor market in Europe, while Germany is viewed as
8having a powerful collective bargaining system. The case of Spain, a neighboring economy, is
of prime interest because its similar labor market institutions have produced remarkably
different labor market outcomes. Indeed, this diversity has spawned  a growing comparative
literature (see, inter al., Blanchard and Jimeno, 1995; Bover, Garcia-Perea, and Portugal,
1997; Castillo, Dolado and Jimeno, 1998; Marinon and Zilibotti, 1998).
 Our main concern is labor demand and labor demand elasticities, and how these
parameters impact a firm’s behavior following a given change in output. Firms in this
framework are assumed to minimize total costs of production, taking output and factor prices
as exogenous variables. Employment is exclusively determined by the demand side of the
market.
There is little controversy in the profession about the short-run effects of labor
regulations on labor adjustment: under strict employment protection regulations firms are
unable quickly to adjust to unexpected shocks in demand. In the long run, however, different
strategies can be followed by firms and the result is a much weaker link between the level of
labor protection and employment (e.g. Bentolila and Bertola, 1990; Bertola, 1991; Bentolila
and Saint-Paul, 1994; Saint-Paul, 1995).
A high speed of adjustment implies that resources can be reallocated between sectors
more easily, meaning that workers are out of job for shorter periods of time, and inefficient
firms are replaced by more efficient ones so that workers will ultimately benefit from higher
wages. It is our contention that a high speed of adjustment to deviations from the long-run
employment-output equilibrium is unlikely to be observed in regimes with stringent
employment protection rules.
Formally, we will follow the Engle-Granger framework to study the employment-
output relation. We will therefore first discuss the time-series properties of the labor demand
variables, then estimate the long-run elasticities, and finally deploy an the error correction
model to evaluate how firms react to deviations from the long-run equilibrium.
9Although the short time span examined here serves to make unit root tests less
powerful, we would maintain that cointegrating techniques and implied long-run relationships
have appeal from the perspective of standard microeconomic theory; that is, where
equilibrium factor demand functions assume the usual form in the levels of the variables. Here
the Engle-Granger approach has the advantage of discussing labor adjustment in a framework
wherein microeconomic equilibrium theory is explicitly taken into account. At the same time,
the derived long-run output and factor price elasticities can then be confronted with other
pieces of evidence as further check on the robustness of the estimated results.
 According to standard microeconomic theory, there exists a labor demand function
relating the levels of employment, output, and factor prices which can be derived from the
cost function of a representative cost minimizing firm. An immediate implication of this
proposition is that the variables need to be cointegrated; otherwise, the parameters of the
estimated labor demand function will be without meaning. Unit root and cointegrating tests
thus provide a direct test of equilibrium microeconomic theory: if the series do not survive the
tests of stationarity and/or there is no cointegrating vector linking the included variables, one
has to conclude that firms either are not rational or that the theory does not pass muster.
[Table 1 near here]
Table 1 shows the evolution of the key variables in all four countries in the sample.
Over the two-decade interval, Portugal shows the strongest output growth and the lowest real
wage increase. Portuguese employment is unchanged, while Spain records a loss of almost
eight hundred thousand manufacturing jobs. The U.K., which evinces the highest increase in
real wages of all four countries, has the worst performance in terms of job destruction: more
than 2.8 million manufacturing  jobs were lost between 1977 and 1997. Germany shows the
second poorest employment performance in manufacturing, with approximately 1.7 million
jobs lost during the 1990s. Growth in output per worker is higher in Spain.
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4. Findings
Unit Root Tests
The results of the unit root tests on the levels of the variables are presented in Table 2.
To determine the number of lags, k, in the estimating equation, we follow Perron (1989). He
suggests starting at lag k =12 and then working backward, choosing k k£  such that the t-
statistic on lag k in the ADF equation is greater than 1.6 (in absolute value) and the t-statistic
on lag l k>  is less than 1.6. In all cases, the implied F(4, T) statistic – which tests for the
presence of (fourth order) serial correlation in the residuals – does not reject the null
hypothesis of no serial correlation. In confirmation of previous findings, none of our series
rejects the null of no stationarity. The critical value at 5% is –3.45 and the highest t ADF  (in
absolute value) is 3.32. In other words, the ADF test cannot reject the hypothesis of the
variables being integrated of order 1.
[Table 2 near here]
Given the problems of uncertainty about the unit root – the unit root is the limit case of
typically high autoregressive series – we have also computed the 90 percent confidence
intervals for the largest autoregressive root, r, after Stock (1991). Note that the reported
asymptotic intervals for r differ from the standard ±2 $s  interval, because when r is large
(nearly one), the confidence interval is discontinous thereby precluding the standard interval
construction.
The computed intervals are very wide, containing values substantially different from
one. But none of them excludes the unit root, a pattern that has been found in other studies;
Stock (1991), for example, reports identical interval width for 14 U.S. macroeconomic series.
Based on these intervals, one cannot reject the results obtained from the ADF tests.
To complement this analysis of the properties of the individual series, we also applied
the procedure described by Zivot and Andrews (1992); that is, we test the null of a unit root
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against the alternative of a trend-stationary series with a single and endogenous breakpoint.
The issue here is whether the unit roots detected in Table 2 are being produced by regime
shifts in the data. This issue has been subject of some controversy since Perron (1989) argued
that most US macroeconomic series reject the null of no stationarity if a break in the trend
function is allowed for. (In Perron, 1989, under the alternative hypothesis the series are trend
stationary with one exogenous break in the data).
The test for a single and unknown structural break amounts to introducing level-shift
and slope-shift dummies in the ADF-type testing equation (respectively defined as
DU t Tt B= £0,  if , and  = 1DUt  otherwise, and DT t T t Tt B B= - >,  if , and DTt = 0  otherwise) and
selecting the unknown breakpoint parameter TB  ( 2 1£ £ -T TB ) such that the tr (i.e. the t-
statistic for testing the presence of a unit root in the series) is minimized. If at t TB= , tr is
greater than the critical value, the null of the series having a unit root is accepted. According
to Table 3, there is confirmation that the series have a unit root, even having allowed for
segmented trends in the data.
[Table 3 near here]
The Static Cointegrating Regression
The general specification models labor demand as a function of output and input
prices that are seen as exogenous variables by cost minimizing firms, as follows
L f W Y RM E INT UC= ( , , , , , ) ,                                                                                                (1)
where L denotes labor demand and W, E, INT, RM, and UC denote the input prices of labor
(real wage), energy, intermediate goods, raw materials, and the user cost of capital (proxied
by the producer price index of investment goods purchased by manufacturing firms),
respectively. Our preferred specification , derived from (1), is a homogenous of degree zero
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labor demand function in relative prices that also includes a deterministic trend term (T) to
control for changes in total factor productivity. Expressed in logs, we have
L T Y RM W E W INT W UC W ut t t t t t t= + + + + + + +a b a a a a a0 1 2 3 4 4( / ) ( / ) ( / ) ( / ) .                     (2)
Given the observed high correlation between input prices (always exceeding 0.90) and
what seems to be a very marginal role of input prices in labor demand adjustment, we decided
to include only one relative price. For Germany, we use the relative  price of intermediate
inputs, for Portugal and Spain the relative price of energy, and for the U.K. the relative price
of raw materials.
From Tables 2 and 3, employment, output, and relative input price variables are not
integrated of order zero. We therefore proceed with the first-stage OLS estimation of equation
(2) in order to establish cointegration of the variables. The results are presented in Table 4.
Besides the widely used ADF cointegrating test, we also present the cointegrating regression
Durbin-Watson statistic (CRDW), even though Campbell and Perron (1991) show that the
latter should not be used to test the null hypothesis of no cointegration against the alternative
of cointegration. In the interest of a preliminary interpretation of the results, it is usually taken
as good indication that the variables are cointegrated if the R2 exceeds 0.95 and the CRDW is
not too low (the lower bound being 0.25; see, for example, Hendry, 1986). In addition,
rejection by the ADF test of the hypothesis that the OLS residuals from (2) are non-stationary
provides some indication of the existence of a cointegrating vector and hence of a long-run
relationship among the included variables.
[Table 4 near here]
At first glance, the evidence from Table 4 is not very strong: the CRDW fails to
exceed the critical value in one case (Spain), the R2 is lower than 0.95 in three cases, and the
ADF test only rejects the null hypothesis of no cointegration in the case of Portugal. To
further check these results, we decided to implement the Za  test described by Phillips and
Ouliaris (1990); a procedure that, in comparison with the ADF test, has revealed superior
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power properties in Monte Carlo studies (Haug, 1996). This test is performed using the
residuals $ut from the OLS cointegrating regression (2) to test for their stationarity. The null
hypothesis is non-stationarity of the residuals, that is, the variables are not cointegrated. The
Za  test also failed to reject the null of no cointegration, irrespective of the number of
estimated autocovariances included in the test, usually four for quarterly data.
Given the low power of these tests (in particular, the problem of substantial size
distortions if the variables under consideration are not really I(1) but have roots close to
unity), the hypothesis of no cointegration will be further discussed in the next section by
introducing one-stage and two-stage ECM-based tests. Pending this analysis, we briefly
comment on the parameters of the static cointegrating regressions reported in Table 4, noting
that the t-statistics obtained from a standard OLS run on (2) cannot be applied to construct
usual confidence intervals because the variables are I(1) thereby violating the constancy of the
variance of the residuals. [6] The parameter estimates can nevertheless be used to derive long-
run labor demand elasticities provided that the variables are in expressed in logarithms and
cointegrated even if no dynamics are specified in model (2).
As expected, all countries display a statistically significant negative trend in
manufacturing employment. Spain and the U.K. (-0.01 in both cases). For Portugal and
Germany, the estimated trend is only half this value. Translated into annual rates, the trend
coefficients imply annual decreases of 4% and 2%, respectively, in manufacturing
employment of the two groups of countries. Output elasticities of 0.62 for the U.K. and 0.84
for Germany confirm the results of previous studies pointing to increasing returns to scale in
manufacturing in these two countries. Thus, for example, Harvey et al. (1986), using a
different approach to model labor demand in the British manufacturing sector, report an
output elasticity of 0.66, which is also the output elasticity found by Flaig and Steiner (1989)
for Germany. Spain has an output elasticity in the same range (0.74), while Portugal has the
lowest output elasticity of all four countries (0.4). Factor price elastiticities are very small
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(less than 0.05) in all countries in the sample other than Spain (0.26). Increases in the relative
prices of energy in Portugal and Spain and of raw materials in the U.K. are expected to lower
the demand for labor. On the other hand, increases in the relative price of the intermediate
input in Germany imply increases in labor demand. In other words, the selected input factors
are complementary with labor in Portugal, Spain, and the U.K. and substitutes for labor in
Germany.
Labor Demand Dynamics
The second stage of the Engle-Granger method estimates the labor demand model in
first differences. However, and contrary to what is known as the econometric tradition in
empirical labor demand (e.g. Hamermesh, 1993,  Abraham and Housemann, 1993, and 1994),
in the time-series tradition the adjustment equation in first differences takes into account the
estimated equilibrium in the levels of the variables. This is achieved by including in the
second-stage ECM model an error correction term that gives information on the past errors
(i.e. past deviations from the long-run equilibrium).
[Table 5 near here]
The results of this procedure are given in Table 5, and were obtained using a general-
to-simple modelling methodology that starts with a over-parameterized model and ends with a
parsimonious specification that keeps as many lags in the model as are necessary to satisfy all
diagnostic regression tests. The model is specified as follows
 D D DL RES L x et t i
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, ,                                                                  (3)
where RES L Lt t t= -$  are the OLS residuals from equation (2) and x t denotes the right-hand-
side variables included in the model (namely, output and relative input prices).
A key estimate of model (3) is the error-correction coefficient l, indicating how
employment reacts to past equilibrium errors, RESt-1 . Typically, the short-run effects gj will
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be smaller than the long-run effects ai (given by the first-stage cointegrating estimation); the
standard error of the static regression is higher than that of the ECM, s s
u e
2 2> ;  and
-< <1 0l when the variables are cointegrated. When l=0 , the variables are not cointegrated.
In other words, performing a standard t-test on the error correction coefficient will serve as a
cointegrating test, and therefore rejection of the null (that this coefficient is zero) is to be
interpreted as rejection of the null of no cointegration (Kremers, Ericsson, and Dolado, 1992).
The ECM model not only allows precise short-run parameter estimation, but also provides
cointegrating tests (called ECM-based cointegrating tests) that have been shown to have
superior power properties than the residual-based tests implemented in the previous section as
they do not impose what is known as the common-factor restriction (Kremers, Ericsson, and
Dolado, 1992; Banerjee, Dolado, and Mestre, 1992).
Hendry (1986) again provides some intuition on a lower-bound for the critical value,
suggesting that a t-statistic for the error correction term (t ECM ) in excess of 3.0 (in absolute
value) would be a good indication that the variables included in the static regression (2) are
cointegrated. To formally test the hypothesis of no cointegration, we will use Mackinnon’s
critical values (Davidson and Mackinnon, 1993, Table 20.2), noting that the standard unit root
critical values are not valid because the t ECM statistic contains the estimated residuals from the
first stage static regression.
Beginning with Hendry’s indicative values for t ECM , Table 5 provides some evidence of
a first-stage cointegrating relationship for Germany, Portugal and the U.K. All countries show
t ECM statistics higher (in absolute value) than 3.0 Not surprisingly, given the cointegration
regression Durbin-Watson (CRDW) statistic of  0.07, the hypothesis of cointegration is
rejected for Spain, where the t-statistic is distinctly higher than –3. [8] Yet, taking
Mackinnon’s critical values, Portugal and Germany pass the test (at 0.10 level), but the U.K.
with a t ECM  of -3.06 definitely does not. Although the one-stage ECM models discussed below
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provide further evidence on cointegration, thus far it seems that for the U.K. and Spain the
labor demand variables may not be cointegrated. Bearing these results in mind, our
subsequent simulation exercises on the path of labor adjustment will implement the cases of
cointegration and of no cointegration (i.e. the model in first differences). For Spain, the
simulation will use first differences exclusively.
In any event, a key finding from Table 5 is the seeming slow rate of adjustment to
disequilibrium in Germany (amounting to 0.05 or 5 percent per quarter) and the U.K. (10
percent per quarter). The values for Germany are approximately half those reported by Flaig
and Steiner (1989) and Belke and Göcke (1997), who obtain error-correction terms equal to
0.12 (in manufacturing) and 0.14 (for the whole economy), respectively. Abraham and
Houseman (1994), despite using a different methodology (the standard Koyck model), report
a speed of adjustment of employment to changes in output for Germany of approximately the
same size: 0.16. The corresponding estimate for the U.S. is 0.62. Converted into mean
adjustment lags, Abraham and Houseman’s estimates represent  a mean adjustment lag of 0.6
quarters for the U.S. and 5.1 quarters for Germany. The same computations, now using our
estimates of the adjustment process to the long-run relationship in Table 5, will yield a mean
adjustment lag of 18.6 quarters for Germany. Given the sample period covered by these three
studies – 1964:1-1986:4, 1970:1-1992:3, and 1973:1-1990:4, respectively – there seems to be
every indication that labor adjustment in Germany has slowed down in the 1990s. Portugal,
for its part, shows a remarkable speed of adjustment, a respectable 52 percent per quarter,
which implies a mean lag of 0.9 quarters, not very far from the U.S. response. We would
caution, however, that these computations are only indicative because in our model there is no
geometric decline in the adjustment process as in the Koyck formulation. As will be made
clear in the simulation exercises, below, although the coefficient l provides an indication of
how firms react to past deviations from the long-run equilibrium, that parameter by no means
exhausts the dynamics of the labor demand because the dynamic adjustment is also reflected
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in the coefficients of the lagged differences included in the model. Nevertheless, the error
correcting coefficient in the Portuguese case is remarkable for its magnitude and significance
level. All regression statistics included in Table 5 are within the expected range and the
lagged differences on employment and output have the expected sign in all cases; the lagged
output difference in Portugal being the sole exception.
[Table 6 near here]
As a test of the error-correction specification in equation (3), Table 6 (OLS columns)
presents the results of fitting an ECM model in which no restrictions are imposed in the
cointegrating vector. We also report (Table 6, NLS columns) the results of a nonlinear one-
stage ECM model in which the short- and long-run elasticities are jointly estimated. The
former approach serves to test the long-run relationships estimated in the first-stage
cointegrating regressions;  the latter provides standard errors on the short-run and long-run
effects and on the error-correction coefficient. To test the hypothesis that t ECM  in this model is
statistically different from zero (i.e. that the variables are cointegrated), we will use the
critical values reported by Banerjee, Dolado, and Mestre (1992).
[Table 7 near here]
The derived long-run relationships are provided in Table 7. Both the OLS and NLS
unrestricted one-stage models largely confirm the cointegrating vectors estimated in the first-
stage Engle-Granger method, particularly with respect to the output elasticity coefficients.
Germany, Portugal, and the U.K. have a long-run output elasticity of 1.0, 0.34, and 0.64,
respectively. In Table 3, the corresponding estimated values were 0.84, 0.40, and 0.62. In both
models, the estimated parameters are highly statistically significant and the short-run
elasticities obtained in Table 4 (for the second-stage ECM model) are also largely confirmed.
The obvious exception is Spain, which not only displays an extremely high output elasticity
(2.2), but also a much higher absolute t ECM  statistic  in the NLS estimation. Therefore,
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although the error correction coefficient is still very small (-0.058) and the t ECM  (-3.22) higher
than the Banerjee, Dolado, and Mestre 5 percent critical value of -3.56 (at 10 percent the
critical value is -3.22), the statistical evidence against cointegration for Spain is less obvious
than in the two-stage Engle-Granger approach. If one is not willing to reject no cointegration,
the evidence is still that the adjustment process to disequilibrium is very slow in Spain.
Overall, and irrespective of the country, the t ECM  statistics of the NLS method do not provide
strong evidence on cointegration of the labor demand variables, with the principal exception
of Portugal and, to a lesser extent, Germany, which meets the critical test value at the .10
level.
We finally address the dynamic adjustment properties of labor demand by simulating
the impact on employment of a permanent increase in output. We already mentioned that
greater flexibility in the labor market should lead, all else constant, to a higher rate of
adjustment of labor to the long-term equilibrium path. Given the methodology followed here,
the simulated adjustment path will take into account the short-term dynamics (taken from the
ECM model), as well as the estimated long-run equilibrium relationships. Thus, substituting
the cointegrating equation into the ECM model, and then expanding the first difference
operator, we obtain a dynamic labor demand equation in levels of the variables which allows
us to simulate the adjustment path of labor following a permanent 1 percent exogenous
change in output demand. In the long-run, the impact on employment is given by the long-run
output elasticity, so that the issue is one of whether the countries in our sample are slow or
quick to adjust to their long-run equilibrium relationships. The results of this simulation
exercise are shown in Figure 1 (a) through (d). Even though the evidence of cointegrating
relationships for Germany and the U.K. is not strong, the simulation exercise will use the
parameters of the two-stage Engle-Granger method. Results from assuming no cointegration
in labor demand – the simple first difference model – show virtually the same pattern of
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adjustment and are not reported here. As noted earlier, the results for Spain were obtained
using the simple first-difference model, that is, the parameters in Table 5, column (b). [8]
The U.K. situation, shown in Figure 1 (d), is that employment takes roughly 4 years to
fully adjust to its long-term equilibrium level. Harvey et al.(1986), using an employment-
output equation (with no input prices), find virtually the same adjustment path. One
remarkable  feature of the U.K. labor demand is the smoothness of the adjustment process.
Despite the relatively small error correction coefficient, the impact on employment steadily
increases in the first 9 quarters, when it reaches its maximum, and then very quickly tends to
the long-run equilibrium. As we will see, none of the remaining countries shows such a well-
behaved adjustment process.
Germany, with a long-run output elasticity of 0.84 in this exercise, is undoubtedly
much slower to adjust to exogenous changes in demand. The maximum impact is reached
only 15 quarters after the initial shock and then declines before converging to its long-term
equilibrium. Even if we concede that changes in labor demand are small after the twenty-
seventh quarter (or even earlier), there is no question that Germany’s adjustment is slower
than that of the U.K. These results can again be compared with Flaig and Steiner (1989), who
report that a 1 percent increase in output achieves its largest impact after seven quarters and
obtains its equilibrium level roughly eighteen quarters later. Their own estimate of the long-
run output elasticity is, it will be recalled,  0.66. [9]
Portugal, which has the largest error correcting term of all four countries, shows
somewhat more erratic adjustment behavior than either the U.K. or Germany. As in the case
of U.K., the peak is achieved very quickly (after seven quarters), labor demand then declines
sharply only to increase again and stabilize at its long- term equilibrium level in the
seventeenth quarter, with very slight shifts thereafter. It seems therefore that in Portugal the
impact on labor demand, although not instantaneous (there is no impact the first quarter), is
very responsive in the first two years with its maximum achieved in the sixth quarter, but the
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visible instability along the adjustment process indicates that the labor market functioning
may not be as smooth as in the U.K., or even Germany.
Patently, Spain shows the most erratic pattern of all. Initially, there is a very quick
response of employment to the exogenous change in demand. The maximum impact is
achieved five quarters after the initial shock, with an almost 2 percent increase in labor
demand. What then follows is a sequence of decreasing ups and downs that stabilize after the
twenty-fifth quarter. We interpret this result as an indication that Spain is still probably facing
the toughest challenges when it comes to adjust manufacturing employment to changes in
demand conditions.
5. Conclusions
There is clearly room for some reassessment of the main characteristics of the
Portuguese system of employment protection. We have seen that the two most influential
"reputation" indexes" (Grubb and Wells, 1993; OECD, 1995) miss important aspects of that
country's regulatory apparatus. In consequence, they accord Portugal an inappropriate rank in
cross-country comparisons of the stringency of national employment protection laws.
This would be less serious were it not for the uncritical use of such ranking exercises in
studies of the covariation of labor market institutions and macroeconomic outcomes. We
believe this to be especially true in the case of Portugal.[10] But the problems are generic.
Given the difficulty of calculating the stringency of employment protection from legal rules
that are often subtle in their wording, applied differently in practice, and provide but one
component of the overall regulatory framework (including collective bargaining), it is perhaps
better to focus on outcomes and then work back. The present treatment, focusing on the cross-
country pattern of labor adjustment to changes in product demand, was offered in this spirit.
Results of using either a two-stage or one-stage error correction model to study the
dynamics of labor demand over the last two decades in Germany, Portugal, Spain, and the
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U.K. were in accordance with (revised) our priors. Specifically, Portugal shows a very high
speed of adjustment to deviations from the long-run employment-output equilibrium. In
conjuction with its low employment-output elasticity, this produces a fairly rapid convergence
to the long-term path. It is also confirmed in our simulation exercise that the U.K. has
undoubtedly the smoothest labor adjustment mechanism of all four countries in the sample,
with the maximum impact of an exogenous change in output being attained very quickly –
after nine quarters. In Germany by contrast the corresponding value is fifteen quarters. More
importantly perhaps, its speed of adjustment would seem to have deteriorated in recent years.
Spain is something of an outlier, combining a fairly rapid initial employment reaction to
changes in output demand with a highly erratic long-run pattern of labor adjustment.
Exercises such as the present treatment provide insights into aspects of the practice of
employment protection. Given the points of conflict with popular indicators of employment
protection, the worth of the latter must be in considerable doubt. Of course, more progress in
understanding the precise impact of employment protection practices awaits the proper
parameterization of individual mandates, reinforcing doubts as to the efficacy of the
conventional highly aggregative measures.
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APPENDIX - Manufacturing Data
Germany (West Germany)
Variable Series Acronym Description
L – Employment DEUEMPMF Employment
Y- Output FDRIP Industrial production
W- Wages FDREARN Hourly earnings
E -  price of Energy input FDRPPIPP PPI of petroleum products
INT – price of intermediate input FDRPPISF PPI of intermediate goods
Source: OECD Main Economic Indicators database (quarterly series) for the period 1977-1994; Federal
Statistical Office 1994 -1997, except for the employment series which was taken from Federal Statistical Office,
1990 onward.
Spain
Variable Series Acronym Description
L – Employment ESPEMPIN Employment
Y- Output ESPIP or MF Industrial production
W- Wages ESPEARN Hourly earnings
PE -  price of energy ESPPPIFU PPI of energy
INT – price of intermediate input ESPPPISF PPI of intermediate goods
Source: OECD Main Economic Indicators database (quarterly series). The sample period is 1977:1-1997:4.The
ESPEARN series is only available until 1994. It was extended into 1997 using the data contained in Encuesta de
Salarios en la Industria y los Servicios.
United Kingdom
Variable Series Acronym Description
 L – Employment GBREMPMF Employment
Y – Output GBRIPMF Industrial production
W – Wages GBREARN Weekly earnings
PE -  price of energy input GBRPPIFU PPI of energy
PRM - price of raw materials GBRPPIRM PPI of raw materials
Source: OECD Main Economic Indicators database (quarterly series). The sample period is 1977:1-1997:4
Portugal
The output series were drawn from Contas Nacionais Trimestrais – INE (Junho de 1998; Maio de
1992). Because the available employment series do not control for the 1983 and 1991 statistical breaks, some
manipulation of the original data was required. In our procedure, the original quarterly series published by INE
were adjusted by the annual series published by Pinheiro (1997) assuming the same the original quarterly shares.
In addition, because manufacturing employment was available on a semi-annual basis between 1977 and 1983,
quarterly figures for this period were computed using quarterly employment indices for the manufacturing sector
published by the Portuguese Ministry of Labor.
Between 1977 and 1990, manufacturing wages are given by an index of quarterly average earnings
published by the Ministry of Labor. This series was discontinued in 1991. Thereafter the information pertains to
negotiated wages at industry level, which is used to complete the series up to 1997. The input price of energy is
given by the deflator of the energy sector and was computed from Contas Nacionais Trimestrais (valores
sectoriais).
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ENDNOTES
[1] Blanchard and Portugal (1998) have recently argued that much hides behind an
unemployment rate, and that in assessing labor market rigidities one should instead look to the
scale of worker and job flows and then to unemployment duration. The present treatment is
predicated on alternative tests based on the speed of adjustment of labor demand to changes in
output.
[2]  The principal dissenting evidence is from establishment surveys inquiring of employers
the reasons, including insufficient flexibility in hiring and shedding labor, why they are not
currently employing more workers (Commission, 1991). In addition, employers have been
surveyed as to their perception of constraints on the management of working time and the
utilization of atypical work (e.g. IOE, 1985). Such surveys produce different, and sometimes
very different, country rankings from the “objective” Grubb-Wells index(es).
[3] Prior to 1975 the law did not require any concrete/objective reason for the termination of
an individual contract. Firms had only to provide advance notice and a severance payment in
proportion to the worker’s years of service.
[4] The wages of those at the upper end of the earnings distribution do not necessarily follow
collectively-bargained settlements. As a result, one observes increasing wage dispersion
within Portuguese firms that is even higher than is observed in many other, more advanced
industrialized nations (Cardoso, 1997).
[5] It would be preferable to work from the beginning with seasonally adjusted data and then
incorporate seasonality into the labor demand model. An adequate treatment requires however
an economic theory that explicitly models seasonality or an econometric strategy that
incorporates seasonal dynamics directly. Examples of such treatments, applied to German
labor demand, are Flaig and Steiner (1989), Belke and Göcke (1997), and Reimers (1998).
Since it was not possible to obtain seasonally unadjusted series for all selected variables and
countries, we applied the seasonal filter (1+L+L2+L3) to the original series.
[6] It can be shown that the OLS estimates are highly efficient with variances O(T-2) and
consistent with an O(T-1) bias.
[7] A low value for l means that the OLS residuals are highly autoregressive and not
stationary.
[8] The simulation using column (a) gives approximately the same results.
[9] Reimers (1998), for the sample period 1972:1-1994:7, reports a long-run output elasticity
of  1.04.
[10] Fallacious assessment of Portuguese labor laws evidently exhibits path dependence.
Thus, in a recent, wide-ranging study of employment protection systems in the EU, Shömann,
Rogoswski, and Kruppe (1998, p. 58) claim that "just cause dismissals include only cases of
dismissals for gross misconduct of the employee." As our discussion in section 2 makes clear,
this is just plain wrong.
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Table 1: Evolution of the Main Variables in Manufacturing, 1977:1 - 1997:4
Output Employment Output per worker Real wage
Germany +27% -23% +65% +35%
Portugal +60%    0% +60% + 5%
Spain +40% -20% +80% +50%
U.K.     0% -40% +70% +60%
Note: Real wages were computed using the CPI series available for each country
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Table 2: Unit Root Tests on the Levels of the Variables
Series
Germany Portugal Spain U.K.
Ho: yt ~ I(1)
ADF      k     F(4, T)     90% Interval
Ho: yt ~ I(1)
ADF         k       F(4, T)      90% Interval
Ho: yt ~ I(1)
ADF         k       F(4, T)      90% Interval
Ho: yt ~ I(1)
ADF         k       F(4, T)      90% Interval
L -2.17     12      1.03        (0.81, 1.05) -1.45         6       0.61          (0.93, 1.06) -2.28        12       1.21          (0.80, 1.05) -3.20        3        0.63          (0.65, 1.03)
Y -2.98     11      0.58        (0.67, 1.04) -3.17        12      0.74          (0.64, 1.02) -2.87        12       1.04          (0.68, 1.04) -2.54        4        0.39          (0.78, 1.04)
p w/ -2.27       9      0.19        (0.77, 1.06) -2.35          8      0.79          (0.77, 1.06) -3.27          8       1.15          (0.53, 1.03) -2.41         4       0.90           (0.77, 1.05)
Notes: The ADF equation is D Dy B y y T ut t i t ii
k
t= + + + +- -
=åa b d0 1 1 , and the null hypothesis is that the series are not stationary.  The number of lags selected is described in
the test. The F(4, T) statistic tests for the presence of (fourth order) serial correlation  in the residuals of the ADF equation (the null is absence of autocorrelation). MacKinnon
critical values for the ADF test are -4.04 and -3.45 at 1% and 5%, respectively. T is the number of observations in the LM test regression. The 90% confidence interval is that
for the largest autoregressive root (Stock, 1991). Definitions of the variables are given in the Appendix. p w/ denotes the relative input price of  intermediate inputs
(Germany), energy (Portugal and Spain), and raw materials (U.K.). The sample period is 1977:1-1997:4.
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Table 3: Unit Root Tests with Structural Breaks
Series
Germany Portugal Spain U.K.
Ho: yt ~ I(1)
  TB                      k             tr
Ho: yt ~ I(1)
  TB                      k             tr
Ho: yt ~ I(1)
  TB                       k            tr
Ho: yt ~ I(1)
  TB                        k            tr
L 1988:3                    10            -4.09 1988:4                     9            -4.80 1983:4                     12           -3.48 1992:2                       3           -4.03
Y 1988:4                    11            -3.91 1987:4                    12            -4.85 1988:4                     12           -3.95 1982:3                       3           -3.23
 p w/ 1983:1                     9             -3.85 1991:2                     9             -3.57 1993:1                       5           -3.49 1988:4                     12           -2.94
Notes: The estimating equation for the test is y DU DT y c y et t t t t j t j t
j
k
= + + + + + +- -
=
åm b q l g l r( ) ( ) 1
1
D , where DU t T DUt B t= £0,  if  and =1 otherwise;
DT t T t T DTt B B t= - >,  if  and = 0 otherwise ; and l=T TB / .  The model was estimated with the breakpoint TB  ranging from t=1977:2 to t=1997:3. TB  was chosen so as to
maximize tr . The number of lags k is again determined using Perron’s selection procedure.The critical values for the test are –5.57, -5.30, and –4.82, at 1, 5, and 10%,
respectively (Zivot and Andrews, 1992, Table 4). Definitions of the variables are given in the Appendix. p w/  denotes the relative input price of  intermediate inputs
(Germany), energy (Portugal and Spain), and raw materials (U.K.).
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Table 4: First-Stage Cointegrating Regressions
Variables
Germany Portugal Spain UK
Constant 12.14 4.33 4.910 6.14
trend -0.005 -0.005 -0.009 -0.011
Output 0.839 0.396 0.739 0.621
p w/ 0,044 -0.034 -0.257 -0.017
R2 0.84 0.93 0.88 0.98
SER 0.029 0.010 0.033 0.022
CRDW 0.43 0.50 0.07 0.38
ADF(4) -2.50 -4.17 -1.94 -2.52
Za  (L = 4) -16,797 -18,172 -6,798 -17,267
Notes: SER is the standard error of the regression, CRDW is the cointegrating regression Durbin-Watson
statistic, and ADF(4) is the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test with four lags. MacKinnon critical value for the ADF
cointegrating test at 5% is -3.78. The Za  test is described in Phillips and Ouliaris (1990), and performed using
the residuals $ut from the cointegrating regression to test for their stationarity. The null hypothesis is no
stationarity of the residuals, that is, no cointegration of the variables. The critical values for two explanatory
variables (not including the intercept and trend)  at 5% are: -29,89 (Haug, 1992, pp. 477-478, Tables 1-3). These
are the small-sample critical values and they differ from the large-sample critical values reported by Perron and
Ouliaris (1990). The parameter  L = 4 denotes the number of estimated autocovariances included in the test
(usually four for quarterly data). The definition of the variables is given in the Appendix. p w/  denotes the
relative input price of  intermediate inputs (Germany), energy (Portugal and Spain), and raw materials (U.K.).
The sample period is 1977:1-1997:4.
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Table 5: Second-Stage ECM Estimation
Variables
Germany Portugal Spain
 (a)               (b)
U.K.
Constant -0.005
(0.0004)
 0.0005
(0.0008)
-0.002          -0.002
(0.0004)     ( 0.0004)
-0.003
(0.001)
RESt-1 -0.051
(0.014)
 -0.520
(0.084)
-0.02
(0.013)
-0.110
(0.036)
DL t-1  0.521
(0.107)
 0.430
(0.101)
 0.550           0.575
(0.109)        (0.107)
 0.640
(0.075)
DLt-2  0.306
(0.103)
 0.398
(0.104)
 0.245           0.240
(0.100)        (0.100)
DYt  0.083
(0.018)
 0.287           0.314
(0.045)        (0.039)
 0.131
(0.033)
DYt-2  -0.229
(0.105)
D( / )p w t  0.047
(0.019)
-0.030         -0.030
(0.011)        (0.011)
R2 0.87 0.54 0.95              0.94 0.68
SER 0.0029 0.006 0.002            0.022 0.006
F
LM(4)
2.63
10.45
2.72 1.71               1.49
7.20               6.25
2.40
ARCH 0.35 0.94 0.84               0.64 1.22
NORM 1.33 1.39 0.67               1.05 2.31
RESET 1.37 0.034 0..65              1.33 0.43
WHITE 0.80 0.58 0.38               0.37 0.89
Notes: Standard errors are in parenthesis. RES L Lt t t- - -= -1 1 1$ , where $Lt is obtained from the OLS first-stage
estimation. SER is the standard error of the regression, and LM(4) is the fourth order autocorrelation test.
MacKinnon critical values for the t ECM  test at 1%, 5%, and 10% are –4.32, -3.78, and 3.50, respectively.  ARCH
is the test for autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity, NORM is the Jarque-Bera test for the normality of
the residuals, RESET is the Ramsey first-order test for functional form misspecification, and WHITE is White’s
test for heteroscedasticity based on the squares of the regressors. The definition of the variables is given in the
Appendix. p w/  denotes the relative input price of  intermediate inputs (Germany), energy (Portugal and
Spain), and raw materials (U.K.). The sample period is 1977:1-1997:4.
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Table 6: One-Stage Unrestricted ECM Models
Variables
Germany Portugal Spain U.K.
OLS NLS OLS NLS OLS NLS OLS NLS
Constant 0.682
(0.191
0.682
0.191
2.172
(0.360)
2.044
(0.361)
-0081
0.078
-0.081
(0.078)
 0.686
(0.219)
 0.685
(0.218)
l - -0.060
0.017
- -0.433
(0.080)
-0.058
(0.018)
- -0.121
(0.036)
Lt-1 -0.060
0.017
- -0.462
(0.081)
- -0.058
0.018
-0.121
(0.036)
     -
Yt-1 0.060
0.021
1.00
0.169)
0.157
(0.042)
0.337
(0.056)
0.125
0.036
 2.144
(0.327)
0.077
(0.028)
 0.643
(0.113)
( / )P W t-1 0.010
0.005
0.160
0.081
-0.026
(0.007)
-0.057
(0.015)
-0.004
0.004
-0.071
(0.051)
0.042
(0.021)
 0.349
(0.193)
trend -0.00027
0.00010
-0.005
0.0008
-0.0029
(0.00045)
-0.006
(0.0006)
-0.0007
0.0002
-0.012
(0.0009)
-0.0006
(0.0005)
-0.0048
(0.0031)
DLt-1 0.465
0.115
0.465
0.014
0.330
(0.106)
0.324
(0.106)
0.331
0.119
 0.331
(0.119)
0.471
(0.107)
 0.471
(0.107)
DLt-2 0.280
0.108
0.280
0.108
0.293
(0.109)
0.281
(0.109)
0.155
0.100
 0.155
(0.100)
DYt 0.091
0.020
0.092
0.020
0.307
0.043
 0.307
(0.043)
0.142
(0.036)
 0.142
(0.036)
DYt-2 -0.272
(0.116)
-0.252
(0.116)
D( / )p w t 0.044
0.021
0.044
0.022
-0.042
0.011
-0.043
(0.011)
R2 0.88 0.88 0.58 0.95 0.96 0.71
SER 0.0029 0.030 0.006 0.0023 0.0021 0.006
Notes: Standard errors are in parenthesis.  Specifications for the OLS and NLS unrestricted ECM models are, respectively:
D D DL L x T L x et t j j t
j
n
i
i
k
t i j i j t i t
i
l
j
n
= + + + + + +- -
= =
- -
=
å å å
=
åm a a b d g0
1
1 1
1 1 0
, , and D D DL L x T L x et t ji j t i
i
l
i
i
k
t i ji j t i t
i
l
j
n
j
n
= + - - + + +- -
= =
- -
== =
å åå å å
L
NMM
O
QPPm l a b d g1 1 1 01 1, , ,  where x j
denotes output demand and input prices. All regression statistics (not reported in the table) show virtually the same behavior as in Table 5.
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Table 7: Derived Long-run Relationships
        One-Stage ECM Model (OLS) One-Stage Nonlinear ECM Model (NLS)          First-Stage Cointegrating Regression
Germany             
L Y p w T= + + -116 10 016 0 0045. . . ( / ) .
    
L Y p w T= + + -102 10 016 0 0045
0191 0169 0 081
. . . ( / ) .
( . ) ( . ) ( . )             (0.0008)
        
L Y p w T= + + -121 084 0 04 0 005. . . ( / ) .
Portugal              
L Y p w T= + - -4 7 0 34 0 06 0 006. . . ( / ) .
   
L Y p w T= + - -4 7 0 34 006 00006
0 36 0056 0 015
. . . ( / ) .
( . ) ( . ) ( . )                 (0.0005)
      L Y p w T= + - -4 3 0 40 0 03 0 005. . . ( / ) .
    
Spain                   
L Y p w T=- + - -14 21 0 7 0 01. . . ( / ) .
        
L Y p w T=- + - -14 21 0 07 001
0082 0 453 0083 0 0013
. . . ( / ) .
( . ) ( . ) ( . ) ( . )                
    
L Y p w T= + - -4 9 0 74 0 26 0 009. . . ( / ) .
U.K.                     
L Y p w T= + + -5 66 0 64 0 35 0 005. . . ( / ) .
    
L Y p w T= + + -5 7 064 0 35 0005
022 011 019 0003
. . . ( / ) .
( . ) ( . ) ( . ) ( . )                     
           
L Y p w T= + - -61 0 62 0 02 0 01. . . ( / ) .
Notes: Standard errors are in parenthesis. Neither the one-stage ECM nor the first-stage cointegrating regresssions provide the standard errors of the long-run estimates.
Figure 1: Labor Demand Adjustment Following a Permanent 1 Percent Increase in Ouput
(a) Germany
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(c) Spain
(d) United Kindgom
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Non-Technical Summary
Economists have long searched for evidence on the effects of national employment protection laws on
such labor market aggregates as employment and, especially, unemployment. Much effort has been
devoted to the construction of synthetic measures of the rigidity of national employment protection
systems via so-called "reputation indexes." In this study, we show that cross-country rankings derived
from these indexes can be misleading by omitting important aspects of national regulatory regimes.
This is unfortunate because such ranking exercises have been used uncritically in many studies of the
covariation of labor market institutions and macroeconomic outcomes. Given the difficulty of
assessing the stringency of employment protection from legal rules that are often subtle in the
wording, applied differently in practice, and provide but one component of the overall regulatory
climate (including collective bargaining), it is better to focus on outcomes and then work
back. The present study, which focuses on cross-country patterns of labor adjustment to changes in
product demand, is offered in this spirit. A modicum of 'corrective' institutional detail on the nature of
employment in protection in Portugal is also supplied because that country has been widely alleged to
be a near exemplar of a sclerotic labor market.
The results of a detailed analysis of the process of labor adjustment in Portugal – benchmarked to the
experiences of Germany, Spain and the U.K. – were in accordance with our (revised) priors.
Specifically, Portugal shows a very high speed of adjustment to deviations from the long-run
employment-output relationship, which, taken in conjunction with its low employment-output
elasticity, produces a fairly rapid convergence to the long-term equilibrium path. Our simulation
exercise demonstrates that the U.K. has the smoothest labor adjustment mechanism of all four
countries in the sample, such that the maximum impact of an exogenous change in output is attained
very quickly (after nine quarters). In Germany, by contrast, the corresponding value is some fifteen
quarters. More importantly perhaps, that country's speed of adjustment would seem to have
deteriorated in recent years. The Spanish case is something of an outlier, combining a fairly rapid
initial employment reaction to changes in output demand with a highly erratic long-run pattern of
labor adjustment.
Exercises such as the present treatment provide insights into aspects of the practice of employment
protection. Given the points of conflict with popular indicators of employment protection, the worth of
the latter must be in considerable doubt – even if the experience of the U.K. matters fairly well with
popular notions of its degree of labor market flexibility. More progress in understanding the precise
impact of employment protection practices necessarily awaits the proper parameterization of
individual mandates at the nation-state level.
